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ABSTRACT 
 
Objective: Which general management and safety models and theories trends influenced safety 
management in the period between Three Mile Island in 1979 and Piper Alpha in 1988? In which context 
did these developments took place and how did this influence Dutch safety domain? 
Method: The literature study was limited to original English and Dutch documents and articles in 
scientific and professional literature during the period studied.  
Results and conclusions: Models and theories of human errors, explaining occupational accidents 
were still popular in the professional literature. A system approach was introduced into mainstream safety 
science, starting in process safety, and subsequently moving into occupational safety. Accidents were 
thought to be the result of disturbances in a dynamic system, a socio-technical system, rather than just 
human error. Human errors were also perceived differently: they were no longer faults of people, but 
consequences of suboptimal interactions during process disturbances. In this period quality of safety 
research increased substantially, also in the Netherlands. 
Major disasters in the 1980s generated knowledge on process safety, and soon process safety 
outplaced developments in occupational safety, which had been leading before. Theories and models in 
this period had advanced sufficiently to explain disasters, but were still unable to predict probabilities and 
scenarios of future disasters. In the 1980s ‘latent errors’ appeared in safety literature, and in The 
Netherlands the concept of ‘impossible accidents' appeared. Safety management was strongly influenced 
by developments in quality management.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This article is one in a series on knowledge development of both safety domain, and safety management. 
Previous publications examined periods extending from the late 19th century until 1979 (Gulijk et al., 
2009; Oostendorp et al., 2016; Swuste et al., 2010, 2014, 2016). These reviews provide insight into 
developments of the international scientific safety domain and in The Netherlands. The current article 
describes developments in process safety, starting in 1979, till the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988.  
The present paper follows the same structure as previous papers. It focuses on knowledge 
development in the designated period but, for completeness, sometimes referrers to earlier papers of this 
series. In conjunction with earlier papers, this work focuses on the following questions: 
 
1. Which general management schools, and theories, models for accident causation have been 
developed? 
2. What was the influence of such developments on safety management in companies? 
3. What was the context within which this development took place? 
4. What were the consequences for professional safety in The Netherlands? 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
The answers to these questions were based on an extensive literature research. The literature research 
was limited to English and Dutch literature, meaning that the developments of safety in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Scandinavia, and The Netherlands tend to be emphasized. Original references and 
scientific articles were accessed via the Delft University of Technology Library and through the internet. 
The following journals were consulted for the period discussed: Accident Analysis and Prevention, 
Journal of Hazardous Materials, Journal of Loss Prevention, Journal of Occupational Accidents, Journal 
of Safety Research and Safety Science. References were followed from: Academy of Management 
Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, American Sociological Review, Ergonomics, California 
Management Review, Hazard Prevention, IEEE Transactions on reliability, IEEE Transactions on 
Systems, Man, & Cybernetics, International Journal of Man-Machine Studies, Journal of Applied 
Behaviour Analysis, Journal of Business & Psychology, Journal of Management, Journal of Management 
Studies, Naval War College Review, Organisation Science, Policy Sciences, Plant/Operation Progress, 
Public Health Reports, Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Risk Analysis, Social Science 
Information Studies, The Academy of Management Review and Reliability Engineering & System Safety 
(from 1988 onward). De Veiligheid (Safety Journal), Maandblad voor Arbeidsomstandigheden or MAO 
(monthly journal concerning working conditions), and Risicobulletin (Risk Journal) were used to study 
developments in The Netherlands. 
 Annex 1 will provide an overview of serious incidents, and major accidents occurring in oil and 
process industries. For this Annex only publicly available information was consulted (Lees, 1996, 
Mannan, 2005; March 2012; Wikipedia, 2014). This table only gives an impression. There is an unknown 
level of underreporting. This bias will vary by country, time and sector. The level of underreporting is 
difficult to estimate. Apart from uncertainties of the numerator, the denominator is a big obstacle. There 
was no information on exposure, or an estimation of the number of active installations, or activities, 
therefore no rates, or time trends could be calculated 
The period concerned saw quite a few disasters in various domains: the process industries, 
nuclear power plants, chemicals storage, space endeavours, maritime transport and railways. The 
disasters generated significant media attention which spurred the professionalization of safety 
management systems that, in retrospect, were relatively simple systems from World War II onwards. The 
introduction of ISO-9000, as a vehicle for improving quality management showed this professionalization 
and was also the model for professionalization of safety management systems (ISO, 1987).  
Two disasters are described with some degree of depth in this article. The article starts with Three 
Miles Island (1979), which was not actually a disaster but painfully exposed a lack of safety management. 
5 
The paper ends with Piper Alpha, in which shortcomings in safety management, one decade later, 
caused the death of 167 people. The paragraphs between these disasters will discuss five subjects:  
 
1. The approaches of general management schools with a focal point on Total Quality Management;  
2. Occupational safety, the state of the art and its knowledge development on accident causality in 
areas of: human factors, sequence of events, energy transport, information exchange, system 
approach, safety climate, epidemiology of accidents, and the OARU model, which was based on 
process disturbances. This era produced just one accident-theory: risk homeostasis; 
3. Process safety, the knowledge development in loss prevention and reliability engineering as well as 
changing views on human factors; 
4. Safety management and safety management systems, their developments, audit systems, high 
reliability and the reaction of corporations to safety issues; 
5. The last part describes developments in The Netherlands. This part features a case study in which 
Shell plays a central role.  
 
This paper, as with previous papers in this series, focuses on the analysis of scientific progress. Changes 
in safety legislation are not included, while for companies legislation is often leading. Our assumption is 
that legal developments, to some degree, will follow scientific developments.  
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THREE MILE ISLAND 
 
On the 28th of March 1979, a defect in the secondary cooling system almost caused a meltdown of a 
nuclear power reactor at Three Miles Island near Harrisburg in Pennsylvania (US). Radioactive gasses 
were vented into the atmosphere, but a nuclear meltdown was prevented. The Report of the President’s 
commission on this accident stated the accident was due to technical failures and to human error. Also, 
the management procedures and emergency response were found to be deficient, and the organisation’s 
safety management system was inadequate (Kemeny, 1979; Lees, 1980). Operators were not trained 
well, procedures were contradicting and safety management only focused on a few major risk scenarios. 
A comprehensive overview of possible major accident scenarios was lacking. A failure in a water pump 
started the process. It led to an increased pressure in the primary cooing circuit, and radioactive gasses 
could escape through a pressure safety valve was inadvertently left open. This particular combination of 
conditions had not been identified in a safety analyses. Also, the control room (Figure 1) was not 
adequately designed to react to a crisis. After the initial fault over 100 audio-alarms were continuously 
ringing in the control room. Operators struggled to identify which alarms were the most important ones. 
Responsible management managed a number of sites from a central office. Managers were several 
hundreds of kilometres distant from the actual site, making communication laborious. Safety was 
perceived as just another bureaucratic task and, lacking priority, had not received sufficient attention. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Control room TMI-2 during the accident (Kemeny, 1979) 
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Tragically, the accident report for the Piper Alpha found similar shortcomings one decade later (Cullen, 
1990). Cullen found that the oil- and gas processing techniques had become exceedingly complex, and 
safety management systems were too fragmented and too inconsistently administered to cope with the 
complexity of the process installations. Before discussing the knowledge development in the fields of 
occupational safety and process safety, we present a brief overview of general management approaches 
is presented. 
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GENERAL MANAGEMENT APPROACHES 
 
The management school of ‘modern management’, discussed in a previous article, was the general 
management approach during the period discussed. Modern management was based on the open-
systems approach, with a focus on the environment within which a company or organisation had to 
operate, with attention to in- and external stakeholders. Management was a decision-making and 
information-processing activity in which managers had to plan, organise, manage and supervise. At this 
time, quality of processes and products became an important element of general management. In 1982, 
Deming’s work on quality control would prove to be an important driver in this school of thought. Deming, 
as well as his countryman, Juran, had revolutionized quality management of production processes in 
Japan after World War II (Deming 1982, Juran 1951, Juran and Barish, 1955). Deming’s work was based 
on earlier collaborations with Walter Shewhart at Bell Laboratories in New York. As early as 1939, 
Shewhart and Deming published their Statistical Process Control or SPC, an approach to understand and 
reduce production process variations (Shewhart and Deming, 1939; Greisler, 1999). Process variations 
came in two kinds, those that were relatively small, and occurred regularly as a consequence of naturally 
variations in the production process, like variations in temperature. There were also large process 
variations, pushing a process to or beyond its tolerances. These large process variations rarely followed 
a normal distribution. Large variations occurred less frequently, but were potentially disrupting to the 
process. Examples include faulty machine-settings or extremely low qualities of raw materials. With 
statistical process control, the process variations could be detected and corrected before the actual 
product was produced. This constituted a major step forward of quality control of products. SPC first took 
off in manufacturing, but the approach proved to be useful in any process with a quantifiable output.  
 
Total Quality Management 
Deming left for American-occupied Japan in 1947. America supported Japanese industry, preventing the 
economically weakened country would become vulnerable to communism. The Marshall Plan for Europe 
had a similar goal. (Leitner, 1999; Judt, 2012). Deming found that weak management was the pivotal 
problem in the low quality of Japanese produced products. He used a simple but effective mantra for 
Japanese managers: ‘if management focuses on quality, costs will drop; but if the focus is on cost, quality 
drops’. Other important features were continuous customer analysis and staff empowerment in 
management decisions. Management’s role was to support staff to work more efficiently and to work 
towards leaner production processes reducing process, stock, and storage cost. Quality control thus 
became part of the relationship between staff and management where all organisational levels were 
subject to statistical control processes (Vinzant and Vinzant, 1999). Such principles made Deming one of 
9 
the founding fathers of Total Quality Management (TQM). It would take almost thirty years before these 
ideas took root in the west (Pindur et al., 1995; Nye, 2013). Leading western publications of TQM were 
‘The change masters’ (Kanter, 1984), ‘In search of excellence’ (Peters & Waterman, 1982) and ‘Images 
of organisations’ (Morgan, 1986). These ideas would slowly trickle down into process and occupational 
safety. 
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OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY  
 
Occupational safety state-of-the-art 
The 1980s showed a notable increase of scientific publications on safety. Safety research centres were 
situated in Scandinavia (Stockholm, Tampere and Trondheim), the United Kingdom (Loughborough, 
Manchester, Surrey, Imperial College and Birmingham-Ashton), the United States (Boston, Chicago, 
Morgantown, Texas Tech and San Diego), The Netherlands (Leiden and Delft), Germany, (Wuppertal 
and Cologne) and France (Paris). 
 The United States kept close to its traditional domains, such as cost of safety (Miller et al., 1987) 
and technical safety measures, such as safety on stairs (Templer et al., 1985) and accidents with 
presses (Collins et al., 1986). Comprehensive works for manufacturing safety were published: the 
Accident Prevention Manual of the National Safety Council (McElroy, 1980) and the last edition of 
Heinrich’s accident prevention book (Heinrich et al., 1980). 
 With the increased focus on research, safety and accidents were taken equally seriously as 
occupational diseases (Haddon, 1980). In the 1980s more articles appeared on the quality of safety 
research, like the beginning of the 1960s. Slowly safety knowledge evolved to a domain with a dominant 
engineering approach (Fellner and Sulzer, 1984). Some authors found that advancements on accident 
classification and causality fell behind (Singleton, 1984). On the topic of prevention there was a lot of 
good will, with little theoretical background (Kjellén and Larsson, 1981; Saari, 1982). This was particularly 
a problem for safety training and education. Cohen and Jensen (1984) stated that training was not very 
effective since it did not focus on the practicalities of job performances. The relation between results of 
accident analyses, and prevention was rather obscure. Often, safety training was based on Haddon’s ten 
strategies for injury control, these being preventive strategies discussed in a previous article. These 
strategies were more like rules of thumb and were not based on scientific research (Compes, 1982). 
Also, the ten strategies were not suited for complex industrial processes, as in process industries 
(Barnett, and Brickman, 1986).  
Often, safety prevention evaluation studies were based on statistics of sick leave after accidents, 
or on sick leave trends before and after implementation of an intervention. This was a troublesome 
approach. Firstly, only averages were used, and hazards were not the only factor affecting sick leave. 
These comparisons were prone to regression to the mean, meaning that differences were wrongly 
attributed to the effects of interventions or measures, leading to faulty conclusions on effects of 
interventions (Hauer, 1980, 1983). Secondly, sick leave was a poor indicator for accident prevention 
since it focused on consequences and suffered from registration biases (Menckel and Carter, 1985; 
Purswell and Rumar, 1984). Thirdly, there was little information available on exposure to hazards, and 
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accident inducing conditions. The concept of exposure was (and still is) poorly developed within safety 
science. Often, the closest organisations approached these pre-existing conditions, like exposure, was to 
stress implementation of a list of safe practice and safe conditions. But this approach did not really catch 
on in organisations (Saari, 1984; Hubbard and Niel, 1985). These safety practices and conditions could 
be scored, providing a numerical ranking of a safety level of different factory departments and 
workplaces. These scores had much in common with the later developed safety indices (Fellner and 
Sulzer, 1984; Frijters, et al., 2008). 
 
Occupational safety: theory, and models 
From the 1970s onwards the accident process of occupational accidents and scenarios were seen as a 
complex phenomenon (Swuste et al., 2016). The insight that occupational accidents were complex 
processes that could not be predicted easily, was still present in the 1980s (e.g. Shannon, 1980). Before, 
occupational accidents were seen as a relative simple phenomenon, the consequence of only one cause. 
More factors played a dominant role, which were labelled with colourful names as ‘unsafe acts’ or ‘unsafe 
conditions’. The relatively straight-forward guidance rules for safe and effective production set out by 
earlier authors (Heinrich et al., 1980), was questioned. Preventive measures and interventions costing 
time and money were doomed to fail. This was also true for measures introducing devious working 
methods, and slowing down production speed (Sulzer and Santamaria, 1980; Monteau, 1983). In this 
period models for causes of accidents were often combinations of pre-existing accident models: 
 
1. The human error model: This model started from the concept that sources of human error should be 
controlled and its frequency should be lowered. The human error model dated back to Heinrich’s 
metaphor of falling dominoes of the early 1940s; 
2. The sequential accident model: where a sequence of events resulted in an accident. This model was 
also based on the domino-metaphor; 
3. The energy model: where the interaction between hazardous energy, the victim and their environment 
determined the accident process. The interplay of technological, human and organisational factors 
determined this interaction. This model originated from Haddon’s work in 1968; 
4. The information model: where an accident was caused by a disruption in communications. This model 
was produced in the 1970s and further developed in Scandinavia. It assumes that workers’ access to 
information and cognitive processes involved played a central role (see Figure 2). Workers at risk 
combined information received with earlier experiences, which influenced how they worked. Various 
internal factors had an influence, like physical condition, motivation, intelligence, and sensory 
limitations. This made this model rather complicated (Saari, 1984); 
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5. The system model: accidents were outcomes of abnormal system conditions. The model focused on 
subsystems, components and their interactions to explain accidents. An accident was an outcome of 
a process disruption of a dynamic system. Injuries occurred when risk factors came into contact with 
individuals. (Tuominen and Saari, 1982; Leplat, 1984). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mechanisms leading to errors in human information processing (Saari, 1984) 
 
The International Labour Office (ILO) adopted the system approach in their encyclopaedia and 
focused on improving occupational systems that were improperly designed or otherwise inherently 
unsafe (Monteau, 1983). The link between design and accidents was, again, a Scandinavian 
viewpoint (Harms-Ringdahl, 1987a). The United Kingdom contributed to this model with their results 
of fieldwork at the Liverpool Ford manufacturing plants (Shannon, 1980; Shannon and Manning, 
1980). Process disturbances were unforeseen events, like being hit, or wricked, or cut by objects like 
machines, particles, oil, tools and moving objects; 
6. The safety climate model: This model was developed in Israel (Zohar, 1980a-b). It was assumed that 
behaviour of workers was influenced by organisational climate which was determined by 
management engagement, the status of safety experts and the importance of safety at work; 
7. The deviation model: a special type of system model. Human errors were seen as consequences of 
poor interactions with the production process, in particular inadequate responses to changes in 
production processes (Kjellén, 1984a, Häkkinen, 1982). This view was immediately attacked by 
authors who emphasized that humans are excellent problem solvers (Hovden and Sten, 1984); 
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8. The accident epidemiology model: This model was used to study accidents with forklifts in the United 
States. An investigation studied and classified 88,000 fork-lift accidents from 1983 – 1985 in terms of 
gender, age, months in a year, type of injury and job description (Stout, 1987). The statistical 
approach raised some eyebrows in the scientific domain; especially the lack of scenario-descriptions 
was seen as a severe shortcoming as causal factors could not be established (Purswell, 1984). 
 
Models were often combined to new models. The time-sequence approach from the deviation model was 
often combined with other models, such as the energy model (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3: The relation between accident process models (Kjellén, 1984a) 
 
An example is the IJEM factors by the ILO (1988). IJEM combined Individual, Job, Environment and 
Materials (Faverge, 1983). The OARU model (Occupational Accident Research Unit, Sweden) was a 
system model that treated deviations and process disturbances as causes of accidents (Figure 4) (Kjellén 
and Larsson, 1981; Kjellén, 1984a-c). The model was based on accident research in mining, 
construction, steel production and railways. Disturbances were leading to injuries, and system factors 
determined accident sequences. The system factors were events, or conditions of a production process, 
deviating from normal process conditions in the material flow, information, simultaneous activities, 
environmental factors or personal protection equipment. Such factors were seen as relative stable 
conditions, present during accident processes, and referring to physical and technical conditions of the 
design of a work process, workplace and work environment. Additional factors were organisational, like 
decision making, maintenance, planning, and training etc., and social-individual, like management 
instructions, communication, and competency.  
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In the United States, the focus on workers’ responsibility for their own safety was more prevalent. 
US literature demonstrates a distinct focus on the human error model. Prevention of accidents could be 
achieved by positive feedback and rewarding safe behaviour. The psychological insights of the time 
dictated that positive sanctions worked better than negative ones (Sulzer and Santamaria, 1980; Heinrich 
et al., 1980; Fellner and Sulzer, 1984; Chhokar and Wallin, 1984; Cohen and Jensen, 1985). This view 
was supported by Scandinavian researchers (Grondstrom et al., 1980; Vuorio 1982). A key element of 
this approach was to observe human behaviour. Sulzer (1987) suggested training some staff to be 
observers. These proposals paved the way toward behaviour-based-safety programs.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: The deviation model (Kjellén, 1984a) 
 
One new theory was developed in the time-span of this paper: the homeostasis theory. The term was 
derived from the natural sciences and described an organism’s capacity to maintain stable internal 
conditions despite changing environments. This dynamic equilibrium in an open system was known as 
‘steady-state’, and differed from a physical-chemical equilibrium, which is static and, according to 
thermodynamics, only applicable to a closed system. The theory originated from traffic safety research 
explaining why drivers seemed to adapt their behaviour according an accepted risk level (Wilde, 1982). 
When drivers felt they drove exceedingly safely, they started driving more aggressively and vice versa. 
Also, owners of very safe cars drove more aggressively than their peers. The debate about this 
compensation behaviour was extensively discussed in the traffic safety literature. This theory had some 
practical problems; how to define a safety level and to combat unsafe adaptations (McKenna, 1985 a-b)? 
The concept was also introduced in occupational safety, extreme safe working environments would 
stimulate unsafe behaviour (Wilde, 1986). However, the homeostasis theory was never accepted in 
occupational safety.  
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PROCESS SAFETY 
 
In process safety, two distinct research schools developed: technical process safety and man-machine 
interactions in a complex technical environment.  
 
Technical process safety 
The explosion at Flixborough in 1974 stimulated British safety researchers to focus on technical causes 
of vapour cloud explosions (Roberts and Pritchard, 1982; Baker, 1982). This research took a turn to a 
more generic interest in safety of complex technical installations. Frank Lees (1931-1999) and Trevor 
Kletz (1922-2013) were important protagonists of this technical approach to safety. In 1980, Lees 
produced a comprehensive compendium ‘Loss prevention in the process industry’ which saw reprints in 
1996, 2005 and 2012 (the last two editions under editorship of Sam Mannan). Lees and Kletz limited their 
field of interest to chemical and petrochemical processing, and their approach provided useful guidance 
in an industry with their increased volumes, dimensions and complexity of chemical process plants (Kletz, 
1999).  
Loss prevention was based on a system model. It mapped risks through system analysis and 
quantifies risks with probabilistic techniques and physical-chemical-reliability models. Kletz argued that 
process plants could be made safer by considering three E’s: Equipment, which focused on creating 
safer process equipment; Equations, to calculate risk and; Experiments, to investigate whether controls 
worked adequately and to explore unknown risks (Kletz, 1988c). Loss of containment, or LoC, was 
considered to be the most important process disturbance of chemical processes. In order to carry out 
comprehensive and reliable quantitative risk analysis (QRA), extensive inter-corporate and international 
databases were established listing risk data in the chemical processing industries (Lees, 1980, 1996; 
Mannan, 2005; Kletz, 1988d). Annex 1 lists major incidents in the era this paper is covering. The United 
States, Japan and Europe seem to have many more accidents than the rest of the world, but this is partly 
due to the focus of this paper on English-language reports. In fact, except Africa, all corners of the world 
are represented in the list, which shows that chemical safety is a worldwide problem. The level of 
underreporting is discussed in the materials and methods paragraph, and shown by the 
overrepresentation of the United States, and the underrepresentation of Japan, and Europe. The large 
portion of accidents with storage and transport in the list is striking (Lees, 1983; Kletz, 1984b-c, 1985a, 
1986). Table 1 shows some of Lees’ process deviation parameters. Four factors were important in LoC 
events: the quantity of materials, the energy they carried, time frame, and dispersion. Quantity was the 
mass and volume of the release. The energy factor was related to the energy needed to transform 
hazardous substances to a toxic, flammable or explosive mixture. The energy content of compressed 
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flammable gasses is high since a LoC could create a huge energy release in a very short time (e.g. via 
explosion). With cryogenic liquids, the energy was lower since energy must be extracted from the 
environment, which would occur relatively slowly. Time was related to the speed in which a material was 
released and the length of time during which the release occurred. Dispersion related to the type and rate 
of release (e.g. sudden or continuous) and the relation between the damage and distance from the point 
of release. Risk analyses used these indicators for their estimations of risk and were considered to be 
key parameters in understanding accident scenarios.  
 
 
Table 1: Some deviations of operating parameters from design conditions (after Lees, 1980). 
 
Scandinavian researchers wrote extensive reviews about risk-based safety analyses and methods. They 
tended to focus on the reliability of data, for instance for failure frequencies for components (Suokas, 
1985; Harms-Ringdahl, 1987b). An engineering approach was prevalent in these publications; they 
emphasized design and re-design of technical installations as the dominant solution for safer industry.  
What you don’t have can’t leak’ was one of Kletz’ mantras (Kletz, 1978). ‘The mantra was 
repeatedly used to explain inherently safe design: keep the design simple, ensure the designer 
familiarizes himself with tasks of the operators, and verify the design with post-hoc risk analysis such as 
HAZOP (Kletz, 1982, 1984a; Clarke, 2008). Scandinavians adopted a similar approach for nuclear power 
Some deviations of operating parameters from design conditions 
  
Process variables Pressure, temperature, flow, level, concentration 
Pressure system  
Mechanical stress, loading, expansion, contraction, cycling effects, vibration, cavitation, 
resonance, hammer; corrosion, erosion, fouling 
Chemical reactions 
Reactions in reactors: nature, rate of main/side reactions; amount and rate of energy 
production (fire, explosion), catalyst behaviour: reaction, regeneration, poisoning, fouling, 
disintegration, and unintended reactions such as: heating, polymerization, corrosion 
Material 
characteristics 
Vapour density; liquid density, viscosity; melting point, boiling point; latent heat; phase 
change; critical point effects; physical state of solids, such as particle size, water content 
Impurities Contaminants; corrosion products; air; water 
Localized effects 
Mixing effects, mal-distribution; adhesion, separation, vapour lock, surging, siphoning, vortex 
generation, sedimentation, fouling, blockage, hot spots 
Time aspects Contact time, control lags, sequential order 
Process disturbances 
Operating point changes, changes in linked plants, start-up, shutdown, utilities failure, equip-
ment failure, control disturbance, operator disturbance, blockage, leakage, climatic effect, fire 
Constructional defects 
Plant not complete, not aligned, not level, not supported, not clean, not leak-tight; materials of 
construction incorrect or defective 
Loss of containment 
Sudden and rapid Loss of Containment (e.g. pressure vessel failure); slower Loss of 
Containment, e.g. via leakage, spillage 
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plants and process industries (Rasmussen, 1980, 1985; Hollnagel, 1983; Suokas, 1985, 1988). The 
prevention measures focused on relatively small accidents and were not easily transferrable to large 
catastrophes (Kletz, 1988a). Kletz’s inherent safe design illustration (Figure 5) tended to be most useful 
for individual processes and sub-processes rather than for entire sites. For reasons of confidentiality, 
litigations and the fear of negative publicity, the findings of safety research in the process industries were 
generally not publicly available. Kletz proposed that transparency would be preferable for several 
reasons. Firstly, because morally it is preferably to inform society ‘if we know, we must tell’. Secondly, 
and more pragmatically, organisations would be better off from learning from each other’s mistakes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Principles of inherently safe design (Kletz, 1985c). 
 
Intensify: use smaller amounts of dangerous goods, which limit the effects of unintended 
release; 
Substitute/Replace: use safer alternatives, e.g. less toxic or less flammable; 
Attentuate:  if a dangerous substance is essential, dilute it, try to operate with less severe 
conditions or use it in a more stable form; 
Attenuate:   reduce effects, change the design to limit the effects of individual releases. 
 
Thirdly, more sharing would be economically beneficial since good practice could be shared. And finally, 
if any one organisation had an accident that could have been prevented by knowledge in another 
organisation, the entire sector would suffer unnecessarily (Kletz, 1988c). 
The United States developed a slightly different approach. They introduced a risk triplet that 
included information about the scenario to the risk calculation. This approach clarified what could go 
wrong and how bad the consequences could be. (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). After introducing this formal 
method, the question of acceptability of such risks becomes relevant. Acceptability of risk is not a 
forthright proposition. First, comparing alternatives is not always straightforward. 
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R = {‹si, pi, xi›} 
 
si: scenario i, which accident scenarios i are relevant? 
pi: what is the probability of occurrence of the scenario i? 
xi: what is the damage that can be expected from the scenario i? 
 
Consider alternative A and B in Figure 6. A has a higher probability for low consequence consequences 
and B vice-versa, but which is better? To discuss acceptability, the context in which risks take place is 
relevant too: who benefits, who suffers, who pays for it, what if a completely different industry could also 
provide societal benefits? Few people are willing to bear risks if benefits are unclear, so the societal 
context is pivotal (Conrad, 1980; Fischhoff et al., 1981; Short, 1984; Covello et al., 1987). A detailed 
description on the acceptability of risk was discussed in one of our earlier publications (Oostendorp et al., 
2016). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: comparing alternative risks (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981) 
 
In the nuclear industry probabilistic risk analysis was an accepted safety technique. Also the process 
industries adopted the approach, entailing functional analyses, fault trees, event trees and risk profiles. 
However, there were major concerns about uncertainties. Model uncertainties in the form of unknown 
risks and uncertainties concerning the quality of data, e.g. component failure rates being one of them. But 
there was also a lack of data concerning human effects of exposure to toxic substances. Thus the 
quantitative approach to risk, suggesting an absolute level of safety, slowly changed status to a best 
practice method in cost-benefit analyses. (Oostendorp et al., 2016, Paté-Cornell, 1987). 
Extensive research efforts in the United Stated led to the development of new safety theories. 
Charles Perrow was spurred by the nuclear incident at Three Mile Island to search for indicators that 
would predict catastrophes. Like Barry Turner (1978), also Perrow was a sociologist, and interested in 
consequences 
Prob
A 
B 
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indicators of major accidents. He systematically investigated process industries, maritime transport, and 
air transport, space travel, dams, mining and DNA-techniques and nuclear power plants. Similar to Kletz, 
he concluded that catastrophic events may have small beginnings, and, additionally, high-risk industries 
share special characteristics explaining the occurrence of catastrophes: coupling and interactions. If 
coupling is tight, and buffers are absent, a fault in one sub-system propagates into other sub-systems, 
and system collapse is more likely. If the system is also complex in the sense that there are strong 
relationships between the sub-systems, system collapse is highly probable. Thus Perrow concluded that 
if processes (with or without dangerous goods) are tightly coupled and the interactions between the 
processes are complex, catastrophe is inevitable, leading to the seminal concept of ‘Normal Accidents’ 
(Perrow, 1984).  
Table 2 shows some of the parameters relating to coupling that Perrow considered relevant. 
Loose systems have slack and allow for delays. They offer flexibility and time for recuperation and 
restoration.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Tight and loose coupling (Perrow, 1984). 
 
Manual processes tend to be loosely coupled and delays can be dealt with. Production pressure or any 
other form of pressure that infringes on time increase the level of coupling. Table 3 shows some 
parameters relating to interactions. In Perrow’s view there were two extremes: linear and complex 
interactions. Complex interaction could be defined in terms of common mode functions. When a process 
controlled several functions, failure effects multiply to affect multiple sub-systems. When many such 
control functions exist, the system became complex. Complexity could also be defined when 
transformation processes were not fully understood, such as certain chemical or nuclear reactions or 
flying in the stratosphere. Complex reactions, multiple product pathways, feedback loops, unexpected 
changes, this complexity became visible in control rooms, in the many parameters necessary for process 
Tight and Loose Coupling Tendencies 
Tight Coupling Loose Coupling 
Delays in processing  not possible 
Invariant sequences 
Only one method to achieve goal 
Little  slack  possible  in  supplies, 
ment, 'personnel 
Processing delays possible 
Order of sequences can be changed 
Alternative methods available 
Slack in resources possible equip- 
Buffers and redundancies are designed-in, 
deliberate 
Substitutions of supplies, equipment, 
personnel limited anq designed-in 
Buffers and redundancies fortuitously 
available 
Substitutions fortuitously  available 
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control, like in Three Mile Island (Figure 1). The assessment of sectors based on the concepts 
represented in Tables 2 and 3 yielded Figure 7 which became famous amongst safety researchers.  
Reason would add a new metaphor in 1987. Following Perrow’s example he analysed the nuclear 
incident at Chernobyl. He introduced ‘resident pathogen’ as a medical metaphor. Similar to the human 
body, technological systems could carry pathogens with the potential to destroy them. Unfortunate events 
can trigger such pathogens, and several of these pathways, scenarios, can combine into catastrophes, 
even if the individual events did not pose a direct threat. This also explained why accidents rarely have a 
single cause. Perrow and Reason paved the way for a new understanding of accidents and catastrophes. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Complex and linear interactions in systems (Perrow, 1984). 
 
Disasters originate from non-observable and usually unforeseeable deviations that cause complex chains 
of events. With the installation of the Chernobyl nuclear plant, society opted for cheap, tightly coupled 
production systems of (nuclear) power, which yielded complex nuclear plants. During an experiment, 
tunnel vision was preventing to understand the reactor was close to its design limits. Management was 
Complex vs. Linear Systems 
Complex Systems Linear Systems 
Tight spacing of equipment 
Proximate production steps 
Many common-mode connections of com- 
ponents not in produi;tion sequence 
Limited isolation of failetl components 
Personnel specialization limits awareness of 
interdependendes 
Limited substitution of supplies and 
materials 
Unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops 
Equipment spread out 
Segregated production steps 
Common-mode connections limited 
to power supply and environment 
Easy isolation of failed components 
Less personnel specialization 
Extensive substitution of supplies 
and materials 
Few unfamiliar or unintended feedback 
loops 
Control parameters few, direct, and 
segregated 
Direct, on-line information sources 
Extensive understanding of all processes 
(typically fabrication or assembly 
processes) 
Many control parameters with potential 
interactions 
Indirect or inferential information sources 
Limited understanding of some processes 
(associated with transformation 
processes) 
Summary  Terms 
Complex Systems Linear Systems 
Proximity 
Common-mode connections 
Interconnected subsystems 
Limited  substitutions 
Feedback loops 
Multiple and interacting controls 
Indirect  information 
Limited understanding 
Spacial segregation 
Dedicated connections 
Segregated subsystems 
Easy substitutions 
Few feedback loops 
Single purpose,  segregated  controls 
Direct information 
Extensive understanding 
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monolithic, distant, and slow and operators only had a limited understanding of the process they had to 
control. It was recognized that the same conditions were present outside Russia. 
Just two years after Chernobyl, two catastrophes would shake the world again. The two most 
lethal catastrophes to date occurred in quick succession: Mexico City, San Juan Ixhuatepec and Bhopal, 
India (Lees, 1996; Pietersen, 2009; Shrivastava et al., 1988; Shrivastava, 1992). The staggering loss of 
life ensured worldwide media coverage and process safety, once again, took centre stage. In Mexico-
City, an LPG storage facility leaked large amounts of flammable vapour into a densely populated area 
through a flange-leak. The gas cloud ignited, damaging supply lines to the storage tanks, and the 
subsequent fires cause multiple Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosions (BLEVEs). 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Industry sectors scaled along coupling and interaction (Perrow, 1984). 
 
The explosions wrecked the storage facility, turning storage tanks into missiles that flew into nearby 
residential areas. An estimated 500 people died with an unknown number of people injured. 
In Bhopal a vapour cloud of the highly toxic substance, methyl-isocyanate (MIC), spread over the 
city from a leaking pipe at the nearby Union Carbide factory. MIC had come in contact with rinsing water, 
22 
leading to an exothermic reaction, increasing pressure and forced MIC through the stack of the factory. It 
took hours before the leak was detected. As MIC spread over the city, more than 2000 people died within 
hours and tens of thousands of people were injured. A decade after the catastrophe, the number of direct 
fatalities had tripled, and an official 30,000 were listed as permanently injured. Union Carbide consistently 
claimed that sabotage, not poor engineering design, was the cause. 
These catastrophes and the high frequency of accidents made the ‘defence in depth’ approach 
popular, first in the nuclear industry and later steadily propagating into the chemical process industries. 
The concept consist of multiple layers of safety barriers, each capable of stopping the accident. This 
would create a more successful accident prevention strategy. Rasmussen (1988a,b) warned the 
approach was not without its shortcomings. Referring to Reason (1987) he argued that multiple barriers 
might not necessarily be visible to operators, meaning failure scenarios were partly activated and could 
lead to consequences if other barriers would fail simultaneously, or later on, without operators ever 
knowing it. In literature, this became known as the ‘fallacy of defence in depth’. 
 
Man-Machine interaction in complex technological systems  
Disasters in this period led to increased attention to human performance. The United States and Western 
Europe developed different views. Human Factors (HF) dominated in the United States. This branch of 
research dealt with quantification of human errors. The United Kingdom and Scandinavia focused on 
human performance in complex technological systems (Swuste et al., 2016). These topics were 
discussed extensively during so-called NetWork (New Technologies and Work) sessions, a multi-
disciplinary workgroup of experts and scientists with different backgrounds, and supported by the 
Werner-Reimers-Foundation (Bad Homburg) and Maison des Sciences de l’Homme (Paris). This group 
published two books during the period covered by this paper: ‘New technologies and human error’ 
(Rasmussen et al., 1987) and ‘The meaning of work and technological options’ (Keyser et al., 1988). 
The engineering approach entailed a separation between workers and hazards as much as 
possible. Automation and remote controlled operations were key to this strategy. In some industries, like 
car manufacturing, energy production and hazardous processes, this trend was already prevalent. In the 
eighties, even more processes were automated, and computers controlled machines in the production 
processes. The distance between the worker and the production process increased and detailed 
knowledge of the production process, and craftsmanship diminished (Singleton, 1984; Rasmussen, 1980; 
Hollnagel et al., 1981). Automation reduced workers’ activities to trouble shooting in case of process 
disturbances (Figure 8). Human performance in technologically complex environments was not well 
understood in the 1980s (Eberts and Salvendy, 1986). Human errors were still viewed as results of 
incompetent operators, and the psychology of fault-generation was underdeveloped. Rasmussen 
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proposed that errors were actually normal variations of human behaviour: variability was a mechanism 
explaining how operators learned to operate the system and deal with unexpected circumstances 
(Rasmussen, 1982; Rasmussen and Lind, 1982). Human errors were viewed as unsuccessful 
experimentations that produced unacceptable consequences. Rasmussen thought an unsupportive 
workplace caused errors because for workers the process was hard to analyse and understand. The 
traditional single-indicator single-response was found to be ineffective, where an action was required 
from an operator, and he, or she, had to discover the state of the system on the basis of the indicator and 
training received. Too little attention went into ergonomic principles whilst designing process control 
systems. An operator required sufficient time and information to correctly react to process deviations. The 
Three Mile Island control room was an example of such an inadequate design. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Control room of potato-mill (© Michel Pellanders 1980). 
 
Information needed to be presented in terms of human mental functions that operator easily 
comprehended and enabling them to perform control functions, and not only in terms of system 
requirements. Humans respond to a total situation: operators have a holistic approach to a state of a 
process. Humans could integrate technically incompatible sources of information and recognizing 
patterns, but were less good at responding adequately to incidental events and deviations arising from a 
one sensor, one indicator technology (Rasmussen, 1983; Rochlin, 1986). 
Rasmussen developed a taxonomy for operator behaviour which he based on empirical evidence 
gathered in the 1970s while analysing problem solution strategies of maintenance operators. He 
published his well-known skill-rule-knowledge model for human behaviour in his 1982 and 1983 papers 
(see Figure 9). The individual levels are not alternatives but interact (Rasmussen 1983). Some years 
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later, this theory would be referred to as the Rasmussen-Reason model (Rasmussen and Reason, 1987). 
An operator’s behaviour in a high-risk, complex technological work environment was captured in three 
different categories: 
 
1. Skill-based: automated and subconscious processes which were prevalent in skills internalized by 
operators’ experiences; 
2. Rule-based: this behaviour was prevalent when the operators used explicit rules to execute a specific 
task; 
3. Knowledge-based: operators used their intelligence to judge situations and find solutions for problems 
that were new or not within the explicit remit of their task; this behaviour required knowledge, 
attention and concentration.  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Simplified representation of Rasmussen’s mental model for operator performance. 
 
Le Coze’s (2014) paper discussed the origin of this model, and pointed to the concept of cognitive 
engineering and its relationship with process design. In cognitive engineering the man-machine interface 
is designed to support operators in their complex task of dealing with unexpected process disruptions 
and deviations. This taxonomy of behaviour was the first initiative to make human performance part of 
the design of controls and so initiated cognitive engineering.  
The Rasmussen-Reason approach was fundamentally different from the contemporary American 
approach to human error, ‘Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction or THERP. This techniques 
originated from the 1960s and based on a probabilistic approach to human errors, the Human Reliability 
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Assessment (HRA) calculations. HRA estimating probabilities of human errors combined with a fault-tree 
approach, similar to a fault-tree for technical systems. A large database was developed to quantify the 
fault trees by the Sandia Laboratories for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Swain and Guttmann, 
1983). Quantification of errors was not restricted to the US alone (Rafaat and Abdouni, 1987). Also in the 
UK it was ascertained that many human errors occurred in so-called ‘human-factor-poor’ working 
environments (Hawkins, 1987). Many authors expressed concerns against quantification. The reliability of 
information was questioned, and therefore its predictive power. A reliable database containing 
observable and reversible errors was nigh impossible, which was also the case for fault-predictions. A 
more fundamental concern was the reduction of human behaviour to a technical system component. It 
did not represent the way how people in technologically complex environments were dealing with process 
deviations. (Singleton, 1984; Rasmussen 1982). 
Organisation psychologists also doubted the quantitative approach, amongst others the American 
Karl Weick (1974, 1979) and the Dutchman Geert Hofstede (1978). Hofstede doubted the quality and 
effectiveness of system feedback loops in organisations. He stated that managing a company, or an 
organisation were fundamentally social processes and not technical ones. Weicks (1974, 1979) 
comments were similar: in his view people in an organisation had to deal with practical organisational 
puzzles and trying to make sense of their predicament. Control, system and feedback were terms that 
carried no value in their decision-making processes; their actions and decisions were rational only in 
retrospect. It would be more sensible to focus on organisational processes (Daft and Weick, 1984; 
Rochlin, 1986; Weick, 1987). Balance, control, feedback, terms from a system approach would not 
explain organisational dynamics. 
By the end of the 1980s a new research direction took off: ‘high reliability organisation (HRO)’. 
HROs were defined as organisations that dealt with very complex processes that were tightly coupled, 
and in contrast to Perrow’s normal accidents, experienced a very low number of accidents. Flight 
operations on aircraft carriers and air traffic control were examples. HROs were organisations that 
performed very reliably despite operating dangerous processes. Reliability, in this context, was 
characterized by learning, understanding and correcting complex processes to prevent accidents. This 
approach was diametrically opposed to the traditional, on mechanistic efficiency focused management 
approach. Weick found that the supposedly efficient HRA method yielded situations in which operators 
would simply not have enough time to respond to complex deviations (Weick, 1987; Roberts, 1988). It 
was actually claimed that: ‘We have third generation machines and first generation minds’ (Westrum, 
1988). Additionally, accident reports of that time emphasized that accidents did not have purely separate 
technical or human causes, but tended to combine these into interactive or synergetic errors. Time 
pressure alone was not the problem; humans could simply no longer understand the complexity of the 
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systems they were operating, and traditional feedback learning was no longer sufficient to achieve 
optimal process control. The breakdown of traditional feedback leaning was part of the HRO philosophy; 
optimal process conditions were a utopian condition. That left two basic options: either the system had to 
simplify, which Kletz proposed; or the operators had to become smarter. When the complexity outgrew 
the capacity of a single human, teams or networks had to do the job. These teams had to be composed 
of people from diverse backgrounds to enhance reliability. An example was the Diablo Canyon reactor in 
California, which was built near four tectonic faults (including the San Andreas Fault and the Hosgri Fault) 
and had to be able to withstand earth quakes with a strength of up to 7.5 on the Richter scale. An 
elaborate seismic detection system was used that could shut down the reactor automatically. At shift 
change process control was handed over as a group process in which a supervisor, an engineer and 
some hand-on operators informed the next shift about the previous shift. To Weick this represented an 
efficient delegation of responsibility and expertise with a minimum of hierarchical structure. (Weick, 
1987). 
Another example central to HRO reasoning was aircraft carriers. Operating these carriers defied 
standard ways of working safely in complex organisations. Organisationally, there was a horizontal 
structure of squadrons, a vertical structure of maintenance and operations, and a crosscutting command 
structure to deal with military units at sea and in the air. On top of that, 100% of all staff was replaced 
every 40 months. And hazards were huge. An aircraft carrier stored vast amounts of high explosives and 
aircraft fuel; it controlled complex air manoeuvres; was propelled by a nuclear reactor, and it often 
operated in hostile waters. The only way to achieve reliability was to build in redundancy in several ways. 
Some responsibilities were delegated to the expert in the front line, meaning someone lowest in 
hierarchical rank could have the authority to cancel flights on the flight deck, or landing of planes. Officers 
had learned to trust the authority of these front-line men, on whom their safety depended. Young officers 
were trainers and learners at the same time; as if the ship was one big school. Fail-safe redundant 
systems were introduced: operations were supported by several teams that could take on each other’s 
responsibilities, and double-checking was operational in nearly all safety-critical decisions and actions. 
The organisation was competent in dealing with process deviations, and all staff could be used multi-
disciplinarily. (Rochlin et al., 1987; Roberts, 1988). Organisational culture was a dominant feature of such 
highly complex high-risk operations. People accepted the way it functioned, shared preconceptions and 
assumptions, identified with personal fulfilment of the activities and tasks, and respected the way 
decisions were made. Quite contrary to organisations in which traditional feedback learning was 
prevalent, HRO organisations hardly required any oversight (Weick, 1987). These specific high-reliability 
organisations did not appear to require a separate safety management system. Only examples of HRO 
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organisations were limited in the period discussed. The majority of organisations that dealt with less 
extreme safety concerns trusted and used safety management systems.  
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SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
 
The time period before 1979 saw the development of basic principles for safety management and quality 
management (Swuste et al., 2016). By 1987 such principles were adopted in international standards for 
quality management, such as ISO 9000 (ISO, 1987). Though ISO 9000 was primarily designed for 
controlling quality, it was adopted for safety as well. Accident reports, time and again, demonstrated that 
management failure was the fundamental cause of accidents, especially by major accidents, and thus 
adequate safety management systems were desperately required. Similarly, the scientific literature 
concluded that management decisions were often haphazard, leading to unsafe situations. This was 
found both for high-risk organisations and occupational safety. Safety simply did not get the attention it 
deserved from contemporary managers. The only safety indicators used were sick leaves after accidents, 
but these provided no insight into the basic causes of accidents (Grondstrom et al., 1980; Kjellén, 1982, 
1984a, 1987; Robinson, 1982; Kletz, 1985b; HSE, 1985; Fischhoff et al., 1987; Harms-Ringdahl 1987a). 
In this approach, managers were assumed not to make errors, whilst front line workers were consistently 
at fault. The Accident-Proneness theory was extremely popular, and it was the preferred theory to design 
accident prevention methods (Tombs, 1988). The disparity between science and practice became almost 
impossible to reconcile (Purswell, 1984; Kjellén 1984a). Another problem was litigation; after major 
accidents new laws were adopted which made safety laws very detailed and almost impenetrably 
complex. This led to an unclear relations between the law and safety performance (Kletz, 1984b, 1986; 
Benner, 1975, 1985). Kletz (1984a) went as far as to claim that criminal prosecution was contra 
productive for safety; prevention was much better. 
After Petersons’ audit system in the previous period, the International Safety Rating System 
(ISRS) was developed by Bird and Germain (1985). ISRS was based on a system of the Chamber of 
Mines of South Africa, the International Mining Safety Rating System measuring safety improvements in 
mining. The audit consisted of 20 elements, each with a dozen of questions (Figure 10). Answers to 
these questions produced a score allowing benchmarking, and guiding management to actions in case of 
negatively answered questions. Unfortunately, a clear relationship between accidents and the audit 
questions was never found (Eisner and Leger, 1988; Guastello, 1991).  
Wildavsky (1988), a political scientist, introduced a completely different approach for safety management, 
in line with HRO. Wildavsky postulated that for well-known hazards in a stable environment, anticipation 
‘a trial without error’ approach prevailed. In these situations hazards were predictable, and controlled with 
safety barriers, protocols, and simulations. This approach is risk avoiding aimed to guard the stability of a 
system. Risk avoidance was dominant amongst companies. Inevitably this stimulated an unbridled 
growth of legislations, protocols and rules amongst organisations and governments. Wildavsky 
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postulated that stable situations were practically non-existent, and a different strategy was required in a 
dynamic environment: resilience. Resilience was an organisation’s capacity to adapt to, and react to 
dynamic conditions and hazards, before causing serious problems. These two fundamentally differing 
approaches concerning hazards and risks illustrated how little was known about functioning of complex 
organisations. And most high-hazard industries should be classified as such (Daft and Weick, 1984). 
Westrum (1988), in his contribution to the ‘Safety Control and Risk Management’ conference of the World 
Bank, presented a classification of organisational reactions towards safety, and saw huge differences 
between organisations and their responses to safety issues. His classification was similar to the one 
suggested by Petersen thirteen years earlier (see Swuste et. al., 2016):  
 
 
 
Figure 10: 20 elements of Loss Control Management (Bird and Germain, 1985). 
 
1. Pathological organisations 
Even under normal operation circumstances, pathological organisations cannot deal with hazards 
effectively. Significant economic pressures forced these organisations to wilfully bypass safety 
regulations. Safety protagonists were ignored, suppressed or punished in such organisations. An 
example was Union Carbide in their bullying tactics in the Bhopal investigation (Shrivastava et al., 
1988; Shrivastava, 1992); 
2. Calculative organisations 
Such organisations work ‘by the book’ when it came to safety management. They were better 
than pathological organisations and could survive during relatively placid time periods. However, 
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this approach was no longer functional in times of change; when unforeseen events occurred; the 
organisation was not able to respond adequately. The incident at Three Mile Island fit that 
management category (Kenemy, 1979). During periods of calm, safety management functions 
reasonably well, but during the four-day crisis, operators could not comprehend the seriousness 
and magnitude of the disturbances occurring inside the reactor; 
3. Generative organisations 
Generative organisations are resilient. They are characterized by strong leadership and creativity, 
which is stimulated throughout the organisation. High Reliability Organisations were examples of 
such an organisation. 
 
Such knowledge, however, was not applied to industry, as the Piper Alpha catastrophe would illustrate: 
an organisation with a pathological management style failed abysmally in the North Sea.  
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PIPER ALPHA 
 
An explosion in the gas-compression section on the 6th of July 1988 initiated the catastrophe on the North 
Sea oil-drilling rig Piper Alpha. The rig connected to three other rigs in the North Sea (see Figure 11). 
The explosion occurred with a pump that was taken out of operation due to a leak but was inadvertently 
switched on.  
 
 
 
Figure 11: connections between Occidental rigs. 
 
It was a consequence of a faltering ‘permit to work’ system. The first explosion destroyed fire-resistant 
walls; the control room; the communication system and the energy supply system. The fire extinguisher 
was out of operation because divers were working near the water inlet which, and a series of explosions 
followed, which razed the rig. It also took a long time to stop the flow of oil and gas kept flowing to the 
platform from Tartan and Claymore, which fed a fire that created a lethal black smoke in the living areas 
where most workers had fled. The catastrophe was the most lethal in offshore history: 167 people died, 
and over 60 survived by jumping off the platform, sometimes from a height of 30 meters.  
Lord Cullen (1990) was asked to lead the investigation. His report contained, the most 
comprehensive accident investigation that had ever been performed in the UK. The report contained 
extensive technical information about the accident and how it had occurred, but it also contained an 
extensive critique of the safety management system operated by Occidental, the operator of the rig, and 
the Department of Energy, the regulator. Occidental managers lacked adequate safety training and 
knowledge, such as basic knowledge of fire control. The ‘permit to work’ system was fatally flawed, and, 
additionally, there was only rudimentary feedback from audits and findings from earlier safety issues. The 
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regulator had failed to detect such shortcomings in their inspections, which was attributed to the lack of 
knowledge on the part of the regulator. The catastrophe laid bare that, despite years of research, safety 
systems were still too underdeveloped to prevent such catastrophes.  
 
DEVELOPMENT OF SAFETY SCIENCE IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
In The Netherlands occupational safety remained important. This period in time saw changes in 
the Dutch professional safety journals and magazines. The name of the magazine ‘De Veiligheid’ (Safety) 
was changed into ‘Maandblad voor Arbeidsomstandigheden, or MAO’ (Monthly magazine for 
Occupational Safety) and the ‘Tijdschrift voor toegepaste Arbeidswetenschap, or TtA’ (Journal for Applied 
Occupational Sciences) was born. TtA published scientific articles on occupational safety, hygiene, 
medicine, and organisational sciences (Korstjens, 1988; Vernooy, 1988). The protection of workers was 
often discussed in this national magazine and journal. Ergonomics and the design of inherently safe 
workstations and equipment were frequently reported (Stassen, 1981; Poll, 1983, 1984; Jong and Poll, 
1984). A popular slogan was ‘you should expect trouble if you allow safe people to work in an unhealthy 
environment’ (Boudri, 1979). Also the attention shifted from the victim of an accident to its context 
(Keyser, 1979; Redactie, 1986). Task dynamics became an important factor (Kraan, 1981; Zuuren, 
1983a) as did ergonomics and safety at the design phase (Comeche, 1979; Zwam, 1979b).  
The second major point of attention focused on safety departments and safety management 
systems. There was focus on the so-called ‘soft’ side of safety: organisational factors (in particular, 
management), perception, and responsibility. This refocusing stared in the 1970s and manifested itself in 
studies in which risk perception, safety climate and safety culture were measured (e.g. Zohar, 1980). 
Zohar’s work was translated into Dutch in the magazine ‘Safety’ (De Veiligheid). The importance of safety 
meetings, training, audits and regulation was also stressed (Zwam, 1979a; Putman, 1986). An early type 
of ‘safety ladder’ was presented which showed quantitatively the different maturity levels of safety for 
organisations. The method proposed safety indicators, like the number of safety audits, frequency of 
safety meetings, number of training courses and the number of task analysis featured (Leij, 1979).  
Concerning the question of responsibility for safety, two schools of thought existed in The 
Netherlands. The first school adhered to the American style Human Factors approach; i.e. primarily, 
workers were responsible for their own safety and the safety of their less senior colleagues. Training and 
exchange of experiences in management teams could facilitate this approach. The Swain project report 
disseminated this approach in The Netherlands (Anonymous, 1982; Blijswijk and Mutgeert, 1987). The 
second school of thought adhered to the British approach in which the responsibility for worker safety 
was primarily that of the organisations and its managers. This approach followed the Robens’ report of 
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1972, blamed failing management and management systems as the primary cause of inadequate safety 
(Oirbons, 1981).  
Amidst discussions about occupational hazards, organisation and responsibility, the new law in 
The Netherlands for occupational hazards was created: the Working Conditions Law (Arbowet). Its 
philosophy was based upon harmonious collaboration and discussion between labour and management 
about safety issues. ‘Humanisering van de arbeid’ (humanization of labour) was the word. The endeavour 
to change labour, and labour conditions where the chances of injury to body and mind were minimized 
(Roos, 1979). The Arbowet also introduced “wellbeing” as a central concept. Additionally, the Minister of 
Labour at the time, Alberda, specifically stated that women and foreigners should not carry an uneven 
burden. Discussion and personal development were to be nurtured, monotonous work to be avoided and 
craftsmanship to be stimulated. (Anonymous, 1979, 1980a; Sluis, 1984). Perhaps not surprisingly, in 
practice these ideals were hard to achieve. Publications in occupational safety journals, such as the 
‘Risicobulletin’ (‘Risk Bulletin’) showed that many corporations often failed in their obligations. Labour 
unions like the industry-union IBFNV supported these findings. Many publications criticized corporations 
that failed to meet the requirements of the new law. Often such publications were based on cooperation 
between unions, universities, and semi-governmental bodies concerning workers’ safety and wellbeing, 
like the Advisory Group on Work and Health (Adviesgroep Stichting Arbeid and Gezondheid). An 
example of such cooperation was research conducted by the University of Leyden Science Shop, 
scrutinizing the American corporation Cyanamid for exposing workers to unacceptably high levels of toxic 
chemicals (Beek et al., 1982). 
Unions played a central part in the critique of corporations. A long list of reports was written about 
poor working conditions in corporations and factories in manufacturing, chemical process industries, 
rubber factories, transport corporations, food processing, construction, electrical engineering and printing 
presses (Vreeman, 1982; Buitelaar and Vreeman, 1985). The reports described unsafe installations and 
unacceptable levels of exposure to chemicals, vibrations, noise, shocks and toxic dusts. Additionally, 
many problems about pay, leave, product quality and low frequency of work meetings were identified 
(Hattem, 1980). For the unions at that time, occupational safety was an important point of critique in the 
Netherlands.  
Alternatively, DuPont Company was criticized because the company stressed safety too much, 
arguing that corporate safety management could even extend into the private lives of it workers (Duyvis, 
1979). This generated quite some resistance amongst Dutch workers. DuPonts’ justification was based 
on the high frequency of domestic accident, influencing labour performance. Workers were encouraged 
to follow corporate safety standards during their holidays (Sluis, 1983). There were safety procedures at 
DuPont for pretty much everything: generic ones, department-specific ones, section-specific ones, and 
34 
procedures right down to individual tasks. Weekly inspections were turned into ‘unsafe act index scores’. 
So many procedures were put in place that if an incident occurred, there was bound to be a broken 
procedure, creating an atmosphere of a negative competition with consequences for pay-rise and 
advancement. DuPont focused on occupational safety and stressed personal protection equipment. Staff 
complained about this approach; a lot was invested in state of the art of personnel protective equipment 
but redesign of machinery to more fundamentally increase safety was out of the question (Boonstra, 
1983, 1983/4). On the whole, this type of behavioural focus on safety, popular in the US, was not 
welcome in the Netherlands (Anonymous, 1980b, 1983b). 
Safety research in the Netherlands also led to a comprehensive compendium for quantitative risk 
analysis (QRA) for process safety. The increased interest in reliability engineering, operations research 
and risk analysis for external risks was treated in the CPR committee, the committee for prevention of 
disasters. CPR published their so-called ‘coloured books’ to support QRA (see Oostendorp et al., 2016). 
These publications became important sources for the initial Seveso Directive of 1982 and contained a 
long list of dangerous goods and activities with threshold values for safe operations. The Dutch Labour 
Inspectorate was also very productive in this period. With their V- and R-series, guidelines for HAZOP, 
process safety analyses, and risk detection systems were published (DGA 1979, 1981, 1984a, b). Also 
the professional press, like ‘De Veiligheid’ (Safety) kept treating process safety and probabilistic risk 
analysis as it had done earlier (Hanken and Andreas, 1980; Leeuwen, 1982; Dop, 1981; 1984, 1985). It 
continued the tradition of publishing about the quality, consequences and results of risk analyses. But 
only a handful of experts seemed to understand the numbers of QRA (Bjordal, 1980) and it was feared 
QRA would be labelled as a scientific approach to the fear of citizens (Irwin, 1984; Eindhoven, 1984). 
Risk perception was inexorably connected to these discussions and extensive studies were performed 
and published into ‘De Veiligheid’ (Stallen, 1980; Stallen and Vlek, 1980; Andreas, 1981). In 1983 the 
magazine featured a paper about the Management Oversight Risk Tree (MORT) an American analysis 
technique targeted at system failures, at that time a decade-old (Zuuren, 1983b). This was in stark 
contrast to the absence of publications on other theories and metaphors, like Perrows’ normal accidents, 
Weicks’ high reliability organisations and Reasons’ resident pathogens. More popular were studies of 
human behaviour in automated process plants. The taxonomy of behaviours and the skill-rule-knowledge 
model by Rasmussen and Reason were discussed in the magazine (Kolkman, 1980, 1981; Stassen, 
1981). This was also the topic of the professorship on Safety Science at the Delft University of 
Technology (Hale 1985). The chair was taken by Andrew Hale, who with co-author Ian Glendon 
published a textbook on ‘Individual behaviour in the control of danger’ (Hale and Glendon, 1987). They 
argued that generally mental information processing of operators and maintenance staff were excellent. 
Only occasionally errors were made, leading to system deviations. However, operator possessed good 
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skills to correct, and therefore could put a process back into its intended operation mode. But systems 
could also move too far out of control. According to the authors, and in line with Rasmussen, this was, 
however, not usually caused by human error, but a consequence of insufficient system knowledge, 
information overload, or management decisions that had insufficiently considered potential risks, and 
disaster scenarios. In reality process safety in industrial plants had become so complicated that 
academic training in chemistry and chemical engineering was required for adequate safety analyses 
(Lemkowitz and Zwaard, 1988; Kletz, 1988b). The Delft University of Technology and the University of 
Amsterdam followed up on these developments by adding chemical process safety as a required course 
in their chemical engineering curriculum (Sectie Veiligheidskunde, 1983; Hale 1987; Bibo, 1987).  
 
The Shell Case 
Another important contributor in the Netherlands was the psychologist Wagenaar (1941-2011). In the 
1970s he worked at the section Human Sensory Studies, an institute of TNO. His work focused on 
decision-making and factors that influenced decision-making. In 1982 he accepted a professorship at the 
University of Leiden, where he studied the origin of human errors. His inaugural speech analysed a 
historic Dutch disaster, namely the huge explosion in Leyden in 1807 of a ship filled with gun powder-that 
destroyed much of the city and killed hundreds. Wagenaar’s concluded it was probably erroneous to 
completely blame the captain who lit a cooking fire on the gun powder loaded ship. More correctly would 
be to consider the wider web of decision makers and decision making that had occurred (Wagenaar, 
1983). The Maritime Research institute granted TNO and Leiden projects to investigate maritime safety. 
A checklist for air transport safety by Feggetter (1982) was used to re-analyse 100 maritime accidents. 
The accidents were classified into three factors of sub-systems: cognitive, social, and situational. In 28% 
of cases, human errors were the main contributing factor, but even with technical factors there was 
always a human element present (Wagenaar and Groeneweg, 1987). This finding justified further 
scrutiny of the human contribution. The conclusion of the subsequent research was that most accidents 
were too complex to blame on humans because it was often too hard for humans to completely 
understand the consequences of their actions. The concept of ‘impossible accident’ was introduced to 
reflect the fact that occurrence and results of accidents were too unpredictable for humans to assess the 
consequences of their actions; their mistakes could only be explained after the accident. It was found 
much more prudent to find the factors that caused people to make mistakes; the diversity of those causes 
was much more manageable than consequences of accidents. By elimination of disturbances to humans, 
entire accident classes could be prevented. Also, the cause of such disturbances was found to be due to 
poor decision making by management. Analysis of accidents at NAM, the Dutch Natural Gas 
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Corporation, and misuse of force cases of the Dutch Police supported these findings time and again 
(Groeneweg, 2002). 
The maritime safety investigation drew attention of Royal Dutch Shell. According to Van 
Engelshove, a top manager of the Exploration and Production division of Shell, the number of people 
killed in Shell’s industrial activities were completely unacceptable, and he challenged local manager Koos 
Visser to come up with solutions to lower the number of casualties. Visser, inspired by Wagenaars work, 
assigned a research grant to Wagenaar (Leyden University) and to Reason (Victoria University at 
Manchester) to investigate industrial safety in Shell’s process plants. The project, ‘From Jungle to Board 
Room,’ had to develop a sensible model on accident causation and tools for ‘local triggers’ and ‘resident 
pathogens’. Additionally, better safety management techniques had to be developed. The whole project 
was called ‘Tripod’, after a three-legged dog in Gabon that had been put down for rabies that he turned 
out not to have. The concept of the safety management system was developed and based upon accident 
research at NAM (Groeneweg and Wagenaar, 1989). 
According to the model accidents were consequences of unsafe acts in combination with specific 
local conditions or precursors. Though such conditions were almost impossible to predict, there was only 
a handful of root causes responsible for accidents: the so-called General Failure Types or GFTs. The 
GFT’s were extracted from the literature to create a list of factors that an organisation ought to control. 
Failure to manage these factors increased the chances of humans of making errors in situations where 
accident precursors were present. The list included: poor ergonomics, inadequate procedures, 
insufficient training and insufficiently clear communication. Ten out of eleven GFT’s were related to 
ordinary business processes which, at first glance, had little bearing on safety. Safety became a product 
of good management and well-managed business processes. The model was quite generic in its design 
so that virtually any organisation could use it by identifying local aspects of GFT’s in their organisations. 
The mantra was relatively straightforward: whether you are dealing with an oil-rig or a lemonade factory 
bad design gets you in trouble. The eleventh GFT was a special one: safety defences. It dealt with 
mapping safety controls. This design triggered a search for indicators that would identify erroneous GFTs 
before accidents had happened. This led to the development of Tripod Delta in the first part of the 
research project. Later on, a tool was developed to try to identify GFT failures after an accident had 
occurred (Tripod Beta). At that time, 1987/1988 Reason had already started writing his seminal work, 
‘Human Error’, which appeared in 1990 (Reason, 1990). It is a tragedy for modern safety scientists that 
Chapter 7 of the original manuscript, which dealt with a history of safety science from the ancient Greeks 
to modern times, was discarded because peer reviewer Brehmer thought it was too dull. Reason decided 
to write an alternative chapter, ‘Latent errors and system disasters’ (Reason, 2013) in which he illustrated 
the new human error concept by applying it to modern incidents, such as the sinking of the Herald of 
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Free Enterprise and the nuclear melt down at Chernobyl. In the Netherlands, Wagenaar became a local 
celebrity and the first media star in the field of human error and safety. What this mostly demonstrates is 
that modern thinking about organisational factors in accidents, which is quite popular today, was quite 
well developed before Piper Alpha blew up in the North Sea. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This literature review describes the development of safety management and accident theories between 
1979 and 1988 in occupational safety, and in process safety, or more generally in high-hazard-high-risk 
industries. It does not mean this knowledge and concepts were popular, or even used by practitioners of 
that time. Sometimes it took years for the knowledge to be taken up by practitioners and sometimes such 
knowledge just disappeared. The uptake was slow for key concepts, such as safety climate, the deviation 
model, and the IJEM risk factors. Tables 4 and 5 present the theories developed in this period of time. 
These Tables answer the first research question of this paper but they also show that occupational safety 
developed less powerful theories than process safety. The rapid knowledge development in process 
safety was probably stimulated by a great number of major accidents in this period, of which many 
received none of only minimal media attention (see Annex 1). 
Human error models prevailed in occupational safety. This was not just the case in the 
Netherlands. But also Scandinavian and American sources, and from publications of the British Society 
for Social Responsibility in Sciences (BSSRS) confirmed a similar trend in many more countries (Kjellén, 
1984c; Purswell and Rumar, 1984). The complexity of accidents was discovered. Additionally, Frank 
Lees created Loss Prevention as a scientific discipline, and Trevor Kletz supplied hands-on practical 
solutions supplemented with his appealing safety one-liners. Furthermore, the systems approach 
developed in process safety found its way into occupational safety: human errors were no longer causes 
of accidents but consequences of complicated process deviations. These findings reiterated findings by 
Winsemius in the 1950s, and an ergonomic approach to safety which started around that time. Tragically, 
literature seldom referred to Winsemius. The term ‘socio-technical systems’ which became a 
commonplace in a previous period, became a popular expression to indicate that relationship. And terms 
like ‘latent conditions’. ‘resident pathogens’, and ‘impossible accidents’ were introduced, the faults of 
organisations came to light, and the concept of human error was redefined.  
Purwell and Rumar (1984) tried to capture the changing relationship between employees and 
their work to explain how safety had changed beyond recognition during the second half of the 20st 
century. They started their narrative before the industrial revolution (Figure 12). The evolution of industry, 
they proposed, caused significant changes in safety. From an original direct coupling between employees 
and their tasks by manual labour before 1800, when employees determined their own safety and 
production speed, the early 1800s saw the introduction of powered manufacturing. This increased 
production speed immensely and changed the relation between the employee and his work 
fundamentally. The employee was now the controller of machinery and was expected to solve problems, 
which increased the pressures on concentration and mental processing. The distance between the 
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employee and powered machine was short, which caused many accidents in factories. Also, managers 
started to depend on employees’ knowledge and experience, which distanced managers from production 
processes. While mechanization of processes made tremendous progress; employees remained 
fundamentally unchanged. The responsibility for safety, however, was now shared between designers 
and managers, who determined the interaction between machines and employees. This relation changed 
again during the second half of the 20th century, when automation and remote control were introduced. 
This new technology changed work and safety another time. The direct control of production processes 
was now in the hands of computers, and productivity and complexity increased immensely. Employees’ 
tasks were reduced to monitoring processes and, if necessary (which occurred rarely), to intervene 
during process disturbances. Both literally and figuratively, the distance to hazards increased. As did the 
need for greater cognitive capabilities of the controller, even if this cognitive power was required only 
infrequently. Thus while employees experienced long periods of boredom, they also experienced 
infrequent, short periods of frantic situations, during which their mental models of the complexity of the 
process they were monitoring proved inadequate. 
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 Figure: 12 Evolution of industry, after Purwell and Rumar (1984). 
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The responsibility for safety was still the responsibility of designers and managers, but the interactions 
between employees’ actions and accidents were not so clear. Situational factors and various human 
shortcomings played a role in safety, but how these interacted was not well understood. At the same 
time, the large accidents increased, both in number and in extent, often extending into public spaces, 
making safety a political issue.  
The prevalent approach in the United States was technocratic in origin and fundamentally 
different, although it had some influence in Europe. It involved databases containing failure frequencies 
of components and humans. The technocratic approach drew varied reaction. In high-density residential 
areas in the Netherlands the technocratic approach was used in urban planning processes (Oostendorp. 
2016), but it was not without critique, related to risk acceptance and consequences of quantification. It 
was thought that the number of high-risk accidents would decrease because they would draw so much 
public attention, while, the risk of low-frequency accidents would actually increase.  
Though much progress was made between 1979 and 1988 there still no clear relation was found 
between general management approaches and safety models and theories and safety management. 
General management approaches were mainly based upon market developments and production 
efficiency. Safety theory and models were fuelled by major accidents, while safety management was 
usually a subsidiary of quality management and became an independent area of attention only after Piper 
Alpha. This disaster served as a wake-up call, but was only partially successful. Accident and disaster 
scenarios did not become prevalent in management decision making. Quality circles from TQM did not 
develop in similar circles for safety to reduce, for incidence, frequencies of process disturbances. What 
did change was the status of safety, which had grown into an academic research discipline. In the 
Netherlands not one but two safety professors were inaugurated: Willem Wagenaar in 1982 at the 
University of Leyden and Andrew Hale in 1984 at the Delft University of Technology. This was not without 
its problems; both professors experienced serious resistance from colleagues in other faculties. 
Nevertheless, the appointment of Wagenaar and Hale was a leap forward for safety sciences.  
 
 
year theories models safety management management approaches 
1979     
1980  
Positive feedback Sulzer-US 
System model Shannon-UK 
Safety climate Zohar-Israel 
  
1981  Deviation model Kjellén-Sweden   
1982 Risk homeostasis Wilde-Canada   Total Quality Management Deming-US 
1983  IJEM risk factors Faverge-ILO  In search for excellence Peters-US 
1984  Information model Saari-Finland  The change masters Kanter-US 
1985   ISRS Bird & Germain-US  
1986    Images of organisations Morgan-US 
1987  
Accident epidemiology Stout-US 
Human behaviour Hale, Glendon-Netherlands 
Behaviour classification Rasmussen-Bad Homburg 
  
1988     
Table 4, Occupational safety, theories, models, and management approaches during 1979-1988 
Nl-Netherlands, Den-Denmark 
Table 5, Process safety, theories, models, metaphors, and management approaches during 1979-1988 
year major accidents-disasters theories, models, metaphors safety management management approaches 
1979 3 Mile Island Harrisburg PA    
1980  System Safety Lees-UK   
1981  Risk triplet R = {˂si, pi, xi˃} Kaplan-US   
1982  Skill-rule-knowledge Rasmussen-Denmark  Total Quality Management Deming-US 
1983    In search for excellence Peters-US 
1984 Bhopal, Mexico City Normal Accidents Perrow-US  The change masters Kanter-US 
1985  Inherent safe design Kletz-UK Loss Control Management Bird-US  
1986 Challenger, Tjernobyl   Images of organisations, Morgan-US 
1987 Zeebrugge 
Resistant pathogen Reason-UK 
High reliability organisations Weick-US 
Impossible accidents Wagenaar-Nl 
  
1988 Piper Alpha, Clapham Junction 
3E’s (equipment-equations-experiments) Kletz-UK 
Fallacy of defence in depth Rasmussen-Den 
Resilience Wildavsky-US 
Classification corporate response 
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Appendix 1 Major accidents in the oil and process industries 1979-1988. Empty cells, no information available 
Date location plant/transport chemical(s) event(s) wounded-wou; death-† 
costs 
106 $ 
1979,Dec 11th Australia – Geelong storage Oil fire  17.4 
Nov 10th  Canada - Mississauga, Ont rail tanker Cl2 emission   
Jan 6th  Germany – Burghausen process industry H2S emission   
Feb 6th  Germany – Bremen flour factory flour dust explosion 14†, 17 wou  
? Germany – Hamburg grain silo grain dust dust explosion 2 wou  
Jan 8th  Ireland - Bantry Bay oil tanker crude oil explosion 50† 31.9 
Jan 11th  Norway - Rafnes process industry Cl2 emission   
Feb 15th  Poland Rotunda Bank   gas cloud explosion 36†  
Dec 11th  Puerto Rico - Ponce tank HC's explosion  23.3 
Oct 17th  Spain - Lerida grain silo grain dust dust explosion 7†  
Nov 24th  Turkey - Danaciobasi   gas cloud explosion 105†  
Mar 20th  US - Linden, NJ catalytic cracker LPG gas cloud fire  27.1 
Apr 8th  US - Crestview, FL rail tanker hazardous chemicals emission 14 wou  
Apr 9th  US - Port Neches, TX oil tanker crude oil explosion  49.6 
Jun 26th  US - Ypsilanti, MI storage C3H8 gas cloud explosion   
Jul 21st  US - Texas City, TX alkylation unit C3H8 gas cloud explosion  37.2 
Jul 18th  US - Bayonne NJ  tanker Cl2 emission 10†  
Jul 28th  US - Sauget, IL reactor mixture explosion  11.9 
Aug 30st  US - Good Hope, LA tanker C4H10 fire ball 12†, 25 wou 16.4 
Aug US - Orange, TX pipeline LPG explosion 1†, 1 wou  
Sep 1st  US - Deer Park, TX tanker - Chevron distillate explosion  105.4 
Sep 4th  US - Pierre Port, LA pipeline LNG gas cloud fire   
Sep 8th  US - Paxton, TX tanker chemicals bleve 8 wou  
Sep 18th  US - Torrance, CA catalytic cracker C3C4 HC's gas cloud explosion   
Oct 6th  US - Cove Point, MD pipeline LNG explosion 1†, 1 wou  
Nov 1st  US - Galveston Bay, TX oil tanker crude oil explosion 32  
1980, Jun 26th  Australia - Sydney oven, refinery oil explosion  25.0 
Feb 26th  Canada - Brooks, AB compression station natural gas explosion  55,6 
Aug 18th  Iran - Gach Saran storage C3H5(NO3)3 major explosion 80†, 45 wou  
Aug 16th  Japan - Shizuoka   gas cloud explosion 15†  
? Italy - Naples grain silo grain dust dust explosion 8 wou  
Oct 8th  Mexico - Mexico City filling station NH4OH emission 9†, 28 wou  
Mar 26th  Netherlands - Enschede  C3H8 gas cloud explosion   
Jul 24th  Netherlands - Rotterdam oil tanker crude oil    
Jan 30st Porto Rica - Bayamon pipeline oil products explosion 1†  
Nov 29th  Spain - Ortuella storage C3H8 explosion 51†  
Jan 21st  UK - Barking storage NaClO3 fire   
Feb 11th  UK - Longport storage LPG fire, explosion   
Nov 20st UK - Wealdstone storage C3H8 emission 0†, 1 wou  
Jan 3rd  US - Acobn, CA refinery  sabotage  20.9 
Jan 20st US - Borger, TX alkylation unit light CH's gas cloud explosion 0†, 41 wou 48.5 
Mar 3rd  US - Los Angeles. CA tanker gasoline bleve 2†, 2 wou  
May 17th  US - Deer Park, TX phenolaceton plant  fire  28.8 
Jul 15th  US - New Orleans, LA pipeline natural gas fire   
Jul 23rd  US - Seadrift, TX C2H4O reactor reaction mixture detonation  16.4 
Jul 26th  US - Muldraugh, KY tanker H2C=CHCl fire 0†, 4 wou  
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Date location plant/transport chemical(s) event(s) wounded-wou; death-† 
costs 
106 $ 
Oct 26th  US - New Castle, DE polypropylene plant C6H14, C3H6  gas cloud explosion 5†, 25 wou  
Oct 29th  US – New Castle, DE platform  gas cloud explosion   
Nov 25th  US - Kenner, LA tanker gasoline fire 7†, 6 wou  
Dec 31st  US - Corpus Christi, TX H2 creaker HC's fire  23.6 
1981,Aug 30st Kuwait - Shuaiba storage oil fire 1†, 1 wou  
Aug 1st  Mexico - Montana tanker Cl2 emission 17†, 280 wou  
Jun 24th  Netherlands - Rotterdam ore-bulk-oil ship oil explosion 6†, 3 wou  
Oct 1st  Czechoslovakia NH3 plant syngas gas cloud explosion   
Sep 6th  UK - Stalybridge solvent unit C6H14 explosion   
Feb 11th  US - Chicago Heights, IL tank tank content explosion  17.4 
Jul 19th  US - Greens Bay, TX reactor herbicides explosion  13 
May 15th  Venezuela - San Rafael pipeline LPG explosion 18†, 35 wou  
May 8th  Sweden - Gotenburg pipeline C3H8 gas cloud explosion 1†, 2 wou  
1982, Jan 20th  Canada - McMurray, AB compressor H2 fire  24.6 
Apr 18th  Canada - Edmonton, AB compressor C2H4 explosion  24.6 
Jan 17th  France - Moselle river pipeline CO emission 5†  
Dec 29th  Italy - Florence tanker C3H8 explosion 5†, 30 wou  
Mar 31st  Japan - Kashima de-sulferasation unit HC's fire  16.3 
Feb 13th  UK - Morley storage herbicides fire, emission   
Sep 25th  UK - Salford storage NaClO3 explosion 0†, 60 wou  
Mar 9th  US - Philadelphia, PA phenol plant C6H5C3H6 gas cloud explosion  29.3 
May 3rd  US - Caldecott tunnel, CA  rail tanker Gasoline fire 7†  
Jun 28th  US - Portales, NM pipeline natural gas explosion 6†  
Sep 28th  US - Livingston, LA tanker mixture detonation, bleve   
Oct 1st  US - Pine Bluff, AR pipeline natural gas gas cloud explosion   
Oct 4th  US - Freeport, TX transformator oil fire  17.2 
Nov 4th  US - Hudson, IA pipeline natural gas explosion 5†  
Dec19th Venezuela - Caracas Tank oil foam fire 150†, >500 wou 58.9 
1983, Apr 14th  India - Bontang LNG plant LNG explosion   
Nov 2nd India - Dhurabar rail tanker kerosene explosion 47†  
Dec 7th  Poland - Lódz   gas cloud explosion 8†  
Aug 31st  UK - Milford Haven tank crude oil fire 20 wou  
Sep 25th  UK - Salford storage NaClO3 explosion 60 wou  
Jan 7th  US - Port Newark, NJ tank gasoline gas cloud explosion 0 wou 40.3 
Mar 15th  US - West Odessa, TX  pipeline LPG fire, explosion 6 †  
Apr 3rd  US - Denver, CO rail tanker HNO3 emission   
Apr 7th  US - Avon, CA catalytic cracker slurry fire  56.3 
May 26th  US - Bloomfield, NM compressor station natural gas explosion 2 wou  
May 26th  US - Produoe Bay, AK drums liquid natural gas fire  40.3 
Jul 1st  US - Port Arthur, TX polyethylene plant  fire  17.8 
Jul 30st  US - Baton Rouge, LA rail tanker H2C=CHCl fire   
30-sep US - Basile, LA gas plant HC's gas cloud fire  33.9 
1984,Feb 24th  Brazil - Cubatao pipeline gasoline fire >100†, 150 wou  
Aug 16th  Brazil - Petrobas Campos   explosion 49†  
Apr 20st  Canada - Sarnia, Ont benzene plant H2 gas cloud explosion 2†  
Aug 15th  Canada - McMurray, AB heating unit HC's gas cloud fire  85.9 
Mar 8th  India - Kerala heating unit HC's explosion  13.6 
Dec 3rd  India - Bhopal tanker CH3NCO emission >4000†, ? wou  
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Nov 19th  Mexico - Mexico City terminal LPG gas cloud fire 650†, ? wou 22.5 
May 23rd  UK - Abbeystead valve CH4 explosion 16†, 28 wou  
Sep 15th  UK - Cheshire process industry  fire   
Jul 23rd US - Romeoville, IL absorption column C3H8 gas cloud explosion 15†, 22 wou  
Sep 25th  US - Phoenix, AZ pipeline natural gas explosion   
Dec 2nd  USSR - Tiblisi   gas cloud explosion 200†  
Dec 13th  Venezuela - Las Piedras de-sulpherisation oil fire  70.1 
1985,Feb 19th  Canada - Edmonton, AB pipeline liquid natural gas gas cloud explosion   
Jan 18th  Germany - Keulen ethylene plant C2H4 gas cloud explosion   
May 19th  Italy - Priola ethylene plant HC's fire  72.8 
Dec 21st  Italy - Napels terminal  fire   
Jan 10th  Netherlands - Den Helder fish factory Cl2 emission 31 wou  
Jan 23rd  US - Wood River, IL asphalt unit C3H8 gas cloud fire  25.2 
Feb 23rd  US - Jackson, SC tanker  emission   
Feb 23rd  US - Sharpville, PA pipeline natural gas explosion   
Mar 9th  US - Lake Charles, LA reforming unit C3H8 gas cloud explosion   
Apr 27th  US - Beaumont, KY pipeline natural gas fire 5†, 3 wou  
Jun 9th  US - Pine Bluff, AR rail tanker hazardous chemicals emission   
Jun 25th  US – Hallet, OK fireworks  explosion 21†  
Jul 6th  US - Clinton, IA ammonia plant syngas explosion  14.7 
Jul 23rd  US - Kaycee, WY pipeline jet fuel explosion 1†, 6 wou  
Nov 5th  US - Mont Belvieu, TX salt storage C2H6, C3H8 gas cloud explosion  44.8 
Nov 21st  US - Tioga, ND gas production HC's gas cloud explosion  11.3 
1986,Feb 24th  Greece - Thessaloniki oil terminal oil fire   
Feb 21st  US - Lancaster, KY pipeline natural gas fire 3†  
Jun 15th  US - Pascagoula, MS distillation column C6H5NH2 explosion   
Oct 30st Swiss - Basel storage pesticides emission   
1987, Jul 3rd  Belgium - Antwerp distillation column C2H4O explosion   
Jun 23rd  Can. - Mississauga, Ont H2 unit H2, HC's fire  22.4 
Oct 11th  Canada - McMurray, AB Oil sand extraction oil sand fire  39.7 
Dec 17th  Canada – Rowan Gorilla platform  gas cloud explosion 0†  
Aug 23rd  China - Lanzhou rail tanker gasoline fire 5†  
Jun 2nd  France - Port Herriot storage oil fire 2†, 8 wou  
Feb 24th  Greece. - Thessaloníki oil terminal oil fire   
Feb 24th  Nederl. - Alphen a/d Rijn  Cl2 emission 30 wou  
Jun 19th  Netherlands - Zeewolde swimming pool Cl2 emission 94 wou  
Aug 15th  Saoudi A. - Ras Tanura gas plant C3H8 gas cloud explosion  67.2 
Mar 22nd UK - Grangemouth ship H2 fire  87.9 
Nov 4th  US – Golf van Mexico platform  explosion   
Nov 14th  US - Pampa, TX acetic acid plant C4H10, CH3COOH gas cloud explosion 3† 24.1 
Nov 24th  US - Torrance, CA alkylation unit HC's fire  16.4 
Dec 20st US – Cook Inlet, AK platform  fire   
1988, Apr 24th  Brazil - Enchchova platform oil fire  690 
Apr 7th  Netherlands - Beek polyethylene plant C2H4 gas cloud explosion   
Sep 8th  Norway - Rafnes vinyl chloride plant C2H3Cl, C2H4 gas cloud explosion  12.0 
Oct 25th  Singap. - Pulau Merlimau tanks nafta fire  13.1 
July 7th  UK – Piper Alpha oil-gas platform  oil-gas explosion 167†, 61 wou 1800 
Jan 2nd  US - Floreffe, PA tank  diesel emission  14.5 
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May 4th  US – Hendersen, NV CH4ClO4 production CH4ClO4 explosion 2†, 372 wou 630 
May 5th  US - Norco, IA catalytic cracker HC's gas cloud explosion 7†, 28 wou 327 
May 5th  US – Norco, LA refinery HC’s gas cloud explosion 7†, 48 wou 600 
Jun 8th  US - Port Arthur, IX storage C3H8 fire  17.4 
Jul 30st US - Altoona, IA rail tanker hazardous chemicals emission   
Jun 4th  USSR - Arzamas station explosives explosion 73†, 230 wou  
  
